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THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION BY RICHARD MOON (TORONTO: UNIVERSITY
OF TORONTO PRESS, 2000)1
BY JAMIE CAMERON
2
I. A NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TASK
That freedom of expression should not be confused with its
constitutional protection is the central message of Richard Moon's recent
book, The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Expression. The author
identifies a tension between the two assumptions that animate the
jurisprudence under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.3 In defining the Charter's guarantee of expressive freedom, the
Supreme Court of Canada portrays individuals as rational and autonomous
beings capable of choosing between good and bad messages. Yet in
considering limits under section 1 of the Charter, the Court assumes that
individuals are powerless to resist the influence of messages that may be
harmful.4 Chapter by chapter, Freedom of Expression explains how this
tension infuses the jurisprudence and how it misconceives the value of the
freedom.
More generally, an examination of constitutional adjudication
demonstrates that clear answers do not exist, and Moon states forthrightly
that he has none to offer.5 He considers it nearly impossible for courts to
define a reasonably clear space for expressive freedom that does not
[Freedom of Expression 1.
2 Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
I I [Charter]. Section 2 provides that "[e]veryone has the following fundamental freedoms: ... (b)
freedom of thought, belief, opinion, and expression .... "
Ibid. Section 1 of the Charter states that "[t]he Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
5 Freedom of Expression, supra note I at 4.
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depend on agreeing with the message or fearing that it might cause harm.6
Not only is reason imperfect and autonomy relative, freedom of expression
operates against a "background of communicative inequality that seems to
lie outside the domain of constitutional review."7 A further problem, then,
is that the "constitutional language of state interference with individual
liberty"8 cannot ameliorate inequities in the "distribution of communicative
resources." 9
The author's final conclusions are less than optimistic. He does not
believe that the freedom's demands can be met within a framework of
rights review. Though it is no revelation that courts often misconceive the
right of freedom of expression and fumble its applications, Moon
challenges the very underpinnings of constitutional adjudication. He
laments that, through the process of constitutionalization, "it may become
natural to think of the freedom as an individual right against state
interference."1 Unfortunately, in his view, that conception advances a
crabbed and limited understanding of expression's social value.
Freedom of Expression offers a collection of insights on issues such
as the regulation of advertising, pornography, and racist expression; access
to state-owned property; and compelled expression. Written over a period
of years, these chapters are introduced by two essays that develop the
central themes of the book." This review comments on these themes,
highlighting the nature of the right to freedom of expression and the ways
in which its exercise may cause harm, before providing a few remarks in
conclusion.
II. A RELATIONSHIP OF COMMUNICATION
Any discussion of expression must begin by asking what freedom
means and why it is worth protecting. On this, Moon is quick to reveal his
dissatisfaction with the traditional explanation of freedom of expression as
an individual right that is enforceable against the state. He contends that
6 Ibid. at 6.
7 Ibid. at 7.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid. at 219.
11 Ibid. The two introductory essays, "Truth, Democracy, and Autonomy" and "The
Constitutional Adjudication of Freedom of Expression," make up chapters 1 and 2 of Freedom of
Expression.
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"as long as the court views freedom of expression through an individualist
lens it will be unable to account for the value or the harm of expression.
12
Instead, the author proposes that the purpose of expression is to protect or
create a "relationship of communication between two or more persons.'
13
Yet, the Court has been unwilling or unable to embrace a social
understanding of freedom, with the result being that the freedom's
"distributive demands ... and its relational character" are suppressed.
14
The section 2(b) jurisprudence is built on a contradiction. In
defining the entitlement, the Court assumes that individuals will respond
rationally to the content of messages; however, in determining limits under
section 1, the Court treats the same individuals as irrational, vulnerable,
and easily manipulated. The text's separation of rights and limits
unquestionably played a role in creating a dysfunctional jurisprudence of
expressive freedom. Even so, nothing in the Charter forced the Court to
adopt a bald contradiction between the simultaneously rational and
irrational individual.
In commenting on this contradiction, Moon points out that the
Court cannot have it both ways at once. On the one hand, if individuals are
rational, then it should be impossible for expression to cause harm, and the
freedom's protection should be unconditional. In other words, the power
of reason should render irrational messages ineffective. 5 On the other
hand, if individuals are irrational, impressionable, and manipulable, limits
on expression should be routinely permitted, and the value of expression
should be called into question. 6 What rationality is, and whether it has
been displaced by an irrational response, are matters of perception. As the
author notes, an "ideal condition of pure reason and perfect independence"
does not exist, nor is it possible to identify "clear deviations from the
proper and ordinary conditions of free choice."'" Moon concludes that if
reason and choice are not the norm, then "we may have to acknowledge
that freedom of expression rests on less solid ground than we once
supposed."' 8
Moon's point can be taken further. Any claim that the state can
12 Ibid. at 56.
13 Ibid. at 37.
14 Ibid. at 33.
15 Ibid. at 56.
16 Ibid.
1 7 Ibid. at 74.
18 Ibid.
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limit expression when there is a risk that some listeners might respond
irrationally is illogical. The prediction that members of the public will
behave irrationally must also extend to those within the political arena.
Individuals in government will be no less irrational in choosing which
messages to permit and which to prohibit than individuals not in
government, who choose between competing messages in the public
domain. It is worth noting that the government's power in parliamentary
democracies is not contingent on any requirement that it be exercised
reasonably or rationally.
However, the rational/irrational dichotomy may not be as central
as Freedom of Expression suggests. Explicit references to rationality in the
Charter jurisprudence are few and far between.19 Under section 2(b), the
content of the message is irrelevant in defining the right, whether rational
or irrational.2 ° Under section 1, the Court did not uphold limits because the
message or listener was irrational but, instead, because the content of the
expression was deemed valueless. 1 Though overlap between the two is
undeniable, valueless expression need not be irrational, and irrational
expression may not be valueless in all cases.22
Insofar as rationality appears in the rhetoric of expressive freedom,
the term is used conceptually rather than literally, to explain that on a
calculation of risks, freedom should prevail over fear.23 With freedom there
is always a chance that irrational or valueless ideas might be an incitement
or provocation to harm. However, regulation is not risk free. When the
state imposes its own definition of value or rationality, public debate will
be stifled. Unless demonstrably harmful, freedom must prevail, and
whether a message is valueless or irrational is of no consequence.
See R. v. Keegstra (1990), 61 C.C.C. (3d) I at 37 (citing the Cohen Committee) and at 49
(cautioning that the role of rationality should not be overplayed) (S.C.C.) [Keegstra]. See also Thomson
Newspapers Co. v. Canada (A.G.), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 at 949 (declaring that Canadian voters can be
assumed to have a certain amount of maturity and intelligence).
20 That is, in part, because the Court was determined that, in the case of section 2(b), the
question of limits would be decided under section 1. See Ford v. Quebec (A.G.), [19881 2 S.C.R. 712
at 766.
21 See Keegstra, supra note 19; R. v. Butler, [19921 1 S.C.R. 452; and R. v. Lucas, [1998] 1 S.C.R.
439.
22 See Keegstra, ibid. at 62. Racial stereotypes which are based on statistics are not irrational but
may nonetheless be deemed valueless and harmful. By the same token, false statements may be
irrational but have value if they promote debate and thereby confirm and solidify the truth. See R. v.
Zundel (1992), 75 C.C.C. (3d) 449 at 508-09 (S.C.C.).
23 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (juxtaposing the power of reason with the silence
coerced by law).
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Moon attributes the rational/irrational dichotomy he sees in the
jurisprudence to individualist values. Under his conception of expressive
freedom, the entitlement is social, not individual, and relational, not
autonomous in nature. The book's two-way process of communication
contemplates a relationship of interdependence between the speaker and
the listener, in which each participates as the equal of the other. The
question for Moon is whether and in what circumstances the speaker has
abused the relationship.
In his view, the interests of both parties should inform the definition
of the right, and abuses of the relationship should not be protected under
section 2(b).24 To the extent that Moon assumes only the speaker can abuse
the relationship, he should be reminded of the case law on hostile
audiences and the heckler's veto.25 It would also be helpful to know how
Moon would evaluate a breakdown in the relationship of communication.
Whether the breakdown is perceived subjectively or objectively, and from
whose perspective, are fundamental issues. Implicitly, if not explicitly, the
author's proposal to define freedom of expression in relational terms rests
on an assumption of equality between the speaker and listener.
Unfortunately, it remains unclear how a relational approach would change
and improve the jurisprudence. Constitutional adjudication addresses the
relationship between a speaker and the state; it is an adversarial
relationship in which individuals challenge the state's authority to impinge
their freedom of expression. Freedom of Expression suggests that the
relationship of communication should be the focus of the analysis, but does
not indicate how that conception of the freedom could be incorporated into
the analytical structure that is required to determine the reasonableness of
the state's actions.
III. NOT A NEUTRAL STANDARD
When, and to what degree, expression "causes" harm is an enduring
imponderable. Under the Charter, though, expression is presumptively free
unless the state can establish a harm that it is entitled to prohibit. As for the
Court, the evidence available may not provide answers but decisions must
still be made. In Moon's words, the Court "listens for the crack of the
billiard balls," but the social science evidence of the causal link between
24 Freedom of Expression, supra note I at 42-49.
25 See e.g. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Feinerv. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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expression and harm "does not yield a crisp and clear sound."26 As a result,
he observes, causation is anything but a "neutral standard., 27 To avoid
retreating from the traditional conception of the freedom, the Court
assumes that individuals can be influenced by irrational or manipulative
messages. This enables the Court to uphold limits under an attenuated
version of the causal link between expression and harm.
The nature of the harm and the limits of constitutional adjudication
are themes that connect the chapters on advertising, pornography, and
racist expression. Moon explains that rights adjudication seeks to enforce
the freedom, and therefore is poised to identify particular exceptions to the
general rule in favour of the freedom. By fixing attention on the discrete
circumstances of expressive activity, decision makers avoid grappling with
the systemic integrity of the freedom. Though the courts may be busy
addressing "discrete and limited problems, just beneath the surface of their
decisions is a challenge to the assumptions that underlie our commitment
to freedom of expression., 28 As long as the systemic imperfections persist,
expression will not be free.
The examples of advertising, pornography, and racist expression
demonstrate that the problems of "free" expression are systemic. In the
case of advertising, public discourse is dominated by the commercialization
of culture, and it matters little whether the content is political or
commercial. 29 Likewise, pornography forms part of a larger culture that is
predicated on sexual and sexist images.30 And, by the same token, racial
insults, slurs, and stereotypes are commonplace and pervasive.31 Charter
interpretation does not attempt to protect or create relationships of
communication which are truly free and bilateral; rather, the object is to
identify the isolated circumstances in which section 2(b)'s protection has
been compromised. Rather than undertake to fix or change what he sees
as wrong in this, Moon closes the discussion by observing that
constitutional adjudication leaves the larger problem of securing a free
public discourse unaddressed. At the same time, the Court places the
protection of all expression on unstable ground.32
26 Ibid. at 39.
27 Ibid. at 62.
2 8 Ibid. at 104.
29 Ibid.
3 0 Ibid. at 124-25.
31 Ibid. at 138.
32 Ibid. at 147.
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The chapters on access to state-owned property and compelled
expression return to the book's introductory theme of inequality in the
distribution of communicative resources. Once again, the discussion
concentrates mainly on the underlying principles and assumptions of the
jurisprudence. For instance, it would help readers to know how this author
would restructure the doctrine on access to state-owned property. Moon's
views do emerge more clearly in his discussion of compelled expression. He
maintains that when the state compels private parties to speak or to grant
access to their resources to others, freedom of expression interests are
served by enlarging the range of publicly expressed views. He concludes
that the freedom should not protect individuals from being compelled to
support or to provide communicative resources to other members of the
community.33
Freedom of Expression does not provide a strong conclusion on the
flaws in an individualist conception of freedom of expression, but closes on
a skeptical note about the ability of constitutional adjudication to transcend
an individualist conception of the freedom. In summary, individualist values
and a misguided assumption that individuals are rational are the formative
elements in the Court's definition of the freedom. Having observed that
individuals are not perfectly rational, the Court adopted a behavioral
rationale to uphold limits under section 1. Not only is there a contradiction
between the two parts of the analysis, the construct is conceptually
unsound. Though the harm of expression may be greater than the courts
acknowledge, an adjudicative model that addressed its systemic effects
could lead to blanket censorship. At the same time, its consequences may
be less serious than the Court claims when it upholds limits, despite gaps
in the evidence of a causal link between expression and harm.
The Charter's system of constitutional rights is not equipped to
address the systemic shortcomings of public discourse. The courts do not
understand that the freedom is not an individual entitlement but a
relationship of communication; nor does adjudication recognize that its
potential can only be realized by eliminating inequalities in access to
communicative resources. The true challenges, for this author, are to
restore balance between the two parties to that relationship and to promote
access to communicative opportunities.
IV. CRACKING THE BILLIARD BALLS
Moon should be congratulated for tackling the difficult task of
33 Ibid. at 202.
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stripping section 2(b)'s guarantee of expressive freedom to its
fundamentals. Twenty years after the Charter, there are few books of this
kind. What follows, then, is more in the spirit of comment than critique.
Essentially, Freedom of Expression has two objectives: one is to
explain the flaws of an individualist conception of the freedom, and the
other is to introduce an alternative conception based on a relationship of
communication and access to communicative opportunities. In the end,
neither part of the project is as well-developed or as concrete as readers
might like. For example, Moon's analysis of the jurisprudence is insightful
and thought-provoking, but inconclusive. Likewise, in the absence of a
definition or outline, his relational and distributive aspirations for freedom
of expression remain fuzzy. Indeed, the author lays the groundwork for his
own critique when he says that cracking the billiard balls should produce a
sound that is clear and crisp.
Two further points can be made. The first returns, again, to the
question of rationality. Expressive freedom is not and should not be
protected because individuals are likely to choose "right" messages over
"wrong" messages. Instead, it is protected because the principle of equality
demands that all individuals be free to express their views, no matter how
reprehensible or idiotic. Such views are a valid part of public discourse,
unless and until they threaten a harm that is concrete enough to outweigh
the value of freedom. What Freedom of Expression overlooks in its account
is the value of dissent. Section 2(b)'s entitlement belongs to the voices of
dissent, as much as to any others, because expressive freedom is a
fundamental element of self-governance. It is the freedom, in and of itself
and without regard to the content of the message, that has value. In other
words, the rational/irrational dichotomy is a red herring for the author, as
well as for the courts.
A second comment is that, although freedom suffers when the state
interferes with it, the state is all but invisible in Freedom of Expression.
Moon's conception of the freedom is preoccupied, instead, by the
relationship between speakers and listeners, as well as by the plight of those
who are without resources. It cannot be forgotten that when the
government places limits on expressive freedom, it exercises its coercive
authority to censor or purge certain messages. There is a substantial risk of
error when limits are placed on expressive freedom, the opportunities for
communication decrease, and public discourse unavoidably narrows. Moon
is surely right that present culture tolerates and even promotes undesirable
messages whose influence and impact cannot be discounted. At the same
time, parliamentary supremacy is systemically and deeply ingrained in
Canada's political culture. With all of its shortcomings, section 2(b) does
place a constitutional check on the government's power to decide what
Book Reviews
freedom of expression means and who will be entitled to exercise it.
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AND INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE ECONOMICS OF
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION BUILDING BY TIMOTHY
SWANSON AND SAM JOHNSTON (CHELTENHAM, U.K.:
EDWARD ELGAR, 1999)
BY JAYE ELLIS'
This book was initially conceived of as a resource for
representatives from developing countries negotiating multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAS). It focuses on the development of
international law and institutions for the management of global commons
resources, that is, resources that are not included in the realm of
competence of a single jurisdictional unit and that require coordination
among different units as well as the development of new structures and
processes for their proper management. The authors' objective is to
provide participants in negotiations with information explaining why
negotiations for the creation of conservation and management regimes for
commons resources break down or produce inefficient or unenforceable
agreements. Given this information, negotiators can avoid these pitfalls in
future negotiations.
The book is divided into three sections: the economics of global
environmental problems, developing international environmental law, and
principles of international environmental law. The first and third chapters
are primarily didactic, providing overviews of economic and legal
frameworks for analyzing global commons resources management. These
chapters will likely be too basic for either political scientists or international
lawyers, but members of each group can benefit greatly from the clear yet
critical overview of the analytical tools of the other group. As a result, the
book thus may promote much-needed communication between these
groups.
The authors analyze efficient resource use, relying primarily on
economic analysis, but taking a critical approach to the analytical tools
employed. The case supporting international co-operation for global
commons resource management is made through reference to the
limitations on state jurisdiction and to externalities that create disincentives
for individual states to pursue globally sustainable resource exploitation.
The authors consider global climate change, biodiversity conservation, and
I Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law and School of Environment, McGill University.
2002] 447
